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Abstract 
The dimension of the alliances has compelled experts to revise their preconceptions about the 
internationalization of companies and to include this strategy in their models as Uppsala model was 
forced to acknowledge. This article focuses on one of the alliances forged in Europe, very deviated 
from the practices of the majority because it was a company with exclusively European partners. It 
adopts the perspective of a peripheral country (Spain) in the global economy and from the special 
status of at least one of the partners in a monopoly. Finally, the article follows case study 
methodology, which aims to delve into the complexity of the processes and the phenomena at hand. 
The article responds to the need for an alternative approach to industry analysis that is particularly 
important for technology-based industries and the most turbulent high-tech industries.  The first 
section examines the creation of European Silicon Structures as a strategic alliance in the European 
semiconductor industry. Parts two and three look at the case of Spain and the role of demand using the 
example of Telefonica. Conclusions are presented in the final section. 
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Introduction  
Global strategic alliances are cooperative business arrangements between actual or potential 
competitor firms from several countries involving joint ventures for short-term contractual 
agreements around a particular problem (such as developing a new product). From a 
managerial perspective, the strategic objectives of these alliances are to enter into a foreign 
market, share the fixed costs and risks associated with the development of new products and 
processes, assist the inter-firm transfer of complementary skills, and establish technical 
standards (Hill, Jones, and Schilling 2016). In a more general framework, firms find in 
international alliances the flexibility to respond to changing market conditions and effective 
paths for enlarging the scale of operations together with green field investment and mergers 
and acquisitions (M&As). The driving forces behind them embrace cost economizing in 
production and R&D, strengthening market presence, and accessing intangible assets.  
During the last two decades of the 20
th
 century, the intensification of competition in open 
markets forced companies to adopt measures that would enable them to meet the new 
challenges in optimal conditions. One of the answers was to develop international strategic 
alliances, which became standard practice in the struggle for competitiveness, but with very 
different results. Sectoral and geographical components influenced the configuration of the 
alliances in such a way that in some industries, such as high-tech industries, they slightly 
outnumbered the amount of M&As and in the case of Europe, on which this article focuses, 
alliances established with the United States predominated over inter-European alliances. 
The dimension of the phenomenon has forced experts to revise their preconceptions about the 
internationalization of companies and to include this strategy in their models; this was the 
case of the Uppsala model, initially very conditioned by its allegiance to Northern European 
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industrial processes. Joining Dunning’s (2001) OLI paradigm, it acknowledges the relevance 
of joint ventures and strategic alliances as ways of internationalizing (Johanson and Vahlne 
2009).  
This article intends to retrieve and explore one of those alliances forged in Europe, which had 
the incentive to deviate from the practices of the majority because it was a company with 
exclusively European partners. The article does this from the perspective of a peripheral 
country (Spain) in the global economy and from the special status of at least one of the 
partners in a monopoly. Finally, it follows case study methodology, which aims to delve into 
the complexity of the processes and the phenomena at hand.
1
  
The article responds to the need for an alternative approach to industry analysis that is 
particularly important for technology-based industries and the most turbulent high-tech 
industries; an approach focusing on complicated networks of relations and taking into account 
multiple possible configurations of value creation and delivery, not merely the typical 
supplier-customer scenario (Klincewicz 2005).  
In terms of its structure, after the introduction the first section examines the creation of 
European Silicon Structures as a strategic alliance in the European semiconductor industry. 
Sections two and three look at the case of Spain and the role of demand using the example of 
Telefonica. Conclusions are presented in the final section. 
 
 
                                                          
1
 In Yin’s (Yin 1993, 59) definition, a case study is an empirical inquiry into ‘a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real-life context and addresses a situation in which the boundaries between phenomenon and context 
are not clearly evident.’ 
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A strategic alliance in the European semiconductor industry: European Silicon 
Structures  
The case study (European Silicon Structures-ES2) emerged as an initiative formed under the 
umbrella of supranational institutions in order to promote the unification and harmonization 
of the market. In the 1980s, the European Community prepared the end of its internal trade 
barriers for the beginning the next decade. The region shifted in telematics from the national 
champions to cooperation strategy, possibly because several states simultaneously faced 
issues of scale. On the other hand, the stock traded by young companies, which was almost 
inexistent some years before, was booming.
2
  
One important feature in Europe was the lack of an indigenous electronics industry (bait for 
the semiconductor industry and driver, in turn, of electronics in general) and an absence of 
management culture; circumstances that were compounded by a lack of correspondence 
between the tremendous emphasis on science and technology and production and marketing. 
Politicians and European business elites looked to lasting technological innovation and risk-
taking in a favourable socio-economic climate as the best hopes to survive in the global 
competition (Forester 1989, 289).
3
 
The dominance of the semiconductor market by standardized products or commodity chips 
allowed some differentiation in speed chips and in quality control, which was a peculiarity of 
the Japanese. Rising R&D costs and climbing capital investments forced the firms to increase 
their sales to recover these costs. Despite the very low and falling marginal costs of chips and 
                                                          
2
 (Sandholtz 1992, 20; Fortune, April 27, 1987). Some pioneering analysts stressed European (and French) 
backwardness (Pouderoux 1968, 22).  
3
 The Roundtable of European Industrialists think tank considered it crucial to abolish national standards 
opposed to free trade in the EC and the remaining telecommunications monopolies, as well as to remove all 
obstacles to cross-border mergers and acquisitions and to extend EC research programmes beyond the 
precompetitive stage (Dataquest 1991, 104).  
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recurrent competitive gluts in this highly cyclical industry, the omnipresence of chips in ICT 
compelled the large companies towards vertical integration for more powerful chips. Three 
relevant processes occurred here. To begin with, the restructuring of research-oriented 
connections in the case of Philips and Siemens and the merger between the Italian SGS with 
the semiconductor operations of the French Thomson. Another process was the 
increasing quest for government subsidies and protection and the third involved sidestepping 
the commodity market through the formation of a new company (Faulhaber and Tamburini 
2012).   
The plans for a new European venture in the semiconductor industry were based on several 
assumptions about, for example, market trends and nature. In  the context of a very fast-
growing full-custom CMOS circuits market, it was expected that this might more than triple 
in the period 1985–1988 in Europe, reaching $1.44 billion in 1991. An increase in full-custom 
circuits from $120 million in 1984 to $1 billion in 1991 was possible. The new firm would try 
to cover no less than one-fifth of the 50 per cent for prototypes and small volume series, a 
market amounting to $110 million in 1991.  
European customers needed professional, industrial, and specialized data-processing 
electronics based on circuit series preferably with reduced design and manufacturing times in 
order to shorten the production process. Meeting this specific need was a significant 
differentiation in comparison to US and Japanese companies, which were more geared 
towards large series. Expertise in high-tech silicon compilers would give speed of design; 
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speed of prototype and small-series manufacturing would be achieved through innovative 
technology.
4
  
At the time, Europe provided around 10 per cent of the world output of semiconductors. 
Several EEC efforts were engaged in increasing that share, including the peaceful 
Mitterrandist EUREKA project. It was one of several programmes with a high degree of risk, 
involving cross-country cooperation on a massive scale between firms in the early stages of 
the process leading from research to industrial application.
5
 
Seven participants of the first EUREKA programme of 1985 helped establish a pan-European 
start-up under French initiative named European Silicon Structures, or ES2. Its objective was 
the production of prototypes or small batches (less than 50,000 units) of full-custom circuits. 
The new firm would train the designers of client companies, assist them in their work, provide 
design tools, and finally offer a packaging and testing service (Forester 1989; Mytelka 1990; 
Sandholtz 1992). This new undertaking was possible thanks to the sum of an original idea 
coupled with the transfer of the managerial and technical knowledge accumulated by the 
founding trio in several European and US firms from the sector, as well as financial backing 
and state political support. The actual brain behind ES2 was the French engineer and well-
                                                          
4
 80 per cent of all European equipment was manufactured in series with less than 5,000 parts; the plant would 
be equipped with an electronic masker: PRS Report Science & Technology, November 8, 1985, 40. 
5
 French president Francois Mitterrand learned about the Silicon Valley organization in situ, made it a source of 
inspiration for a European common technology, and met with leaders in computer chips and information 
systems: Le Monde, December 28, 1985; The New York Times, March 26, 1984. Advisers to Mitterrand included 
Hubert Curien, former president of CNES (France’s national space agency), who conceived EUREKA to 
counterbalance Reagan’s plan for a Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) – a space-based missile defence: (Friend 
1998,   228; Business Week, 3.108–3.121, 1989, 158). The ES2 project was estimated at ECU 94 million; other 
projects include: the Philips-Siemens MEGA (the base of the controversial JESSI (Joint European 
Semiconductor Initiative)) at a total cost of some ECU 2,000 million; the EUROCIM project, whose cost was 
around ECU 30 million; and the EUROLASER project, costing around ECU 80 million (Cowhey and Aronson 
1993, 157; European Commission, Press Releases, 31/10/1986, 2). 
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trained cosmopolitan manager Jean-Luc Grand-Clement, who contacted business elite 
member Robert R. Heikes, head of the National Semiconductor Corporation’s operations in 
Europe and Latin America.
6
 They consecutively brought in Robert W. Wilmot, chairman of 
the British computer maker ICL Ltd., and a London-based venture capital firm, Advent, the 
overseas branch of Boston’s TA Associates, America’s largest group in its class.7 Some of 
them were participants in previous projects. Heikes and Grand-Clement, director general and 
general manager at Motorola Europe and Glasgow, respectively, were also involved in a plant 
project for semiconductors in Malta.
8
  
Because a large amount of capital ($50 million) was needed to build the company and to 
equip the plant and research labs, the founders decided on a pan-European firm, more intricate 
than the previous simple bilateral ventures.
9
 Advent injected the first half a million dollars in 
                                                          
6
 Engineer of the École Nationale Supérieure de Télécommunications, experienced in Eurotechnique and in 
Electronics in CIT-Alcatel, as well as a founder of the L’Occitane of electronics (Le Monde, September 4, 1985). 
7
 Motorola taught Grand-Clement ‘the importance of having solid financing and a clear strategy from the start’. 
When Grand-Clement, former senior manager in Motorola Europe, contacted Saxby, Saxby’s secretary said: 
‘There’s a Frenchman on the phone, and he sounds a bit like Inspector Clouseau’(Saxby 2012). Some sources 
added other venture capital to Advent: Technoventures and Euroventures, founded in 1984 by the European 
group Asea/Fiat/3M/Olivetti/Bosch/Volvo (Lipnack and Stamps 1993, 124) and it was backed by a number of 
giants including Pirelli and Saint-Gobain (Fortune, April 27, 1987), Four Seasons/Alfa-Laval, the Fjarde AP 
Fund, SFP, and others such as Schroder Ventures (Investors Chronicle, 86, 1988,   81; PRS Report Science & 
Technology, November 8 1985, 9; Les Echos, 5/4/1995). Advent appears sometimes as coordinator of funding 
and Robb Wilmot as the prime mover in ES2 (Investors Chronicle, 75, 1986, 61). Wilmot came from a 16-year 
stay at Texas Instruments Inc. and from the post of executive chairman of International Computers Limited 
(ICL) (1984), ultimately becoming managing director of its British subsidiary (PRS Report Science & 
Technology, November 8, 1985, 40; The New York Times, October 24, 1990). Wilmot commented in 1987: ‘The 
day may not be far ahead when it will cost less to design a custom chip than buy a secondhand car’: 
Semiconductor International, 12(1–6), 1987, 76. 
8
 Heikes explained that the advantages of Malta were a comparatively low wage scale combined with common 
market preferences; negotiations continued in 1974: Industrialization: Motorola Semiconductors, October 1, 
1973, Wikeleaks, 1973VALLET01930_b; April 10, 1974, 1974VALLET00677_b. 
9
 French-Italian export oriented agreement Sescosem-Mistral (Pouderoux 1968, 22). Rod Attwooll confessed that 
the involvement of some depended on the involvement of others: ‘they all separately said they would invest if X 
would – and promised to talk to X. While weeks and months passed. In the end, we got them all into a room in a 
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seed capital and offered its offices in the early days, and ES2 eventually raised near to $100 
million in corporate investment, venture capital, and grants (Campbell 2003).
10
 The situation 
in 1985 was as follows: the two leading European venture capital companies, Advent (London 
and Belgium) and Techno-Venture Management (Munich), as well as Alpha Associates in 
France, Orange Nassau in Holland, and Four Seasons in Sweden, had provided $4 million. 
Industrial investors and financial institutions from six European countries would provide the 
remaining $61 million, in equal amounts, with the absence of any non-European sources. The 
capital structure should have been, in principle, as follows: 25 per cent from the founders and 
the personnel; 15 per cent from venture capital; 30 per cent from large manufacturers; and 30 
per cent from ‘institutions’.11 Table 1 displays subsequent financial operations for several 
years. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
hotel in Brussels and told them to get down to talking to each other. With hindsight, silicon fabrication on 
venture capital money was a tall order’ (Campbell 2003, 59).  
10
 A source reported the ambitious programme: $65 million to start, or $100 million over 5 years for a full setup: 
PRS Report Science & Technology, November 8, 1985, 40. Sources differed on data: $46 million according to 
Fortune, April 27, 1987; Advent seeded ES2 with about $5 million and there was start-up capital of $60m 
according to The Economist, 303, 1987, 71; $60 million was gathered from eight European corporations 
(including Italy’s Olivetti, Sweden’s Saab, the UK’s British Aerospace, and the Netherlands’ Philips) according 
to The Scientist, November 28, 1988. Venture Capital disbursements grew by a factor of 6.4 from 1978–1986. 
Capitalization of ES2 in 1988 was at 44 million dollars, similar to Matra Harris and Mietec. ES2 had the most 
substantial venture-capital backing seen so far outside the US: Electronics, 59, 1986. Some scholars considered 
the company as ‘an ambitious – some might say foolish – stab at creating the first European-based designer and 
developer of integrated circuits at a time when a worldwide glut of silicon chips was wreaking havoc with the 
industry’ (Brooke and Penrice 2009, 66). 
11
 The Four Seasons intended to present the project to a number of investment groups in Sweden, including 
Folksam and Aktiv: PRS Report Science & Technology, November 8, 1985,  36. The project did not include 
dynamic countries like Ireland, then on the way to becoming a European Silicon Valley, as asserted by the 
government: Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Reagan, Ronald 1986, 801). 
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Table 1. European Silicon Structures, financing 
Date    
Financing 
($Million) 
1985 Advent, London; Techno-Venture Mgmt. Corp.  5 
Dec. 1985  
Brown Boveri and CIE of Switzerland;  25 
Ing. C. Olivetti & Co. (Italy); N. V.    
Philips (Netherlands); Saab-Scandia    
AB (Sweden)    
Jan. 1986  
British Aerospace  5 
Banque International in Luxembourg;  9 
European Investment Bank    
Source: Compiled by author using data from Dataquest, June 1988, 205. 
ES2’s structure was established during the most awful recession in the semiconductor 
industry’s history (Cowhey and Aronson 1993).12 As a main feature, ES2 had complex legal 
development, which allowed it introduce itself as a local company in the various countries in 
which it was implemented (PRS Report Science & Technology, Europe & Latin America, 
January 26, 1988, 11–12).13 National boundaries were still an issue, requiring export licenses 
even within Western Europe as well as the usual transport documentation. Lacking the 
European legal status for a pan-European company, ES2 was incorporated in Luxembourg as 
a parent company of several subsidiaries in each country in which it was implemented; a 
holding company with national subsidiaries.
14
 The composition of the board of directors 
displayed in Annex 1 shows the presence of founders, financers, and some executives from 
the sector, including the French-international Bernard Pruniaux, formed in France, trained in 
                                                          
12
 See also The New York Times, August 1, 1988. 
13
 In Germany it was established as ES2 GmbH (Wedgwood ed. 2013, 146); in the United Kingdom as ES2 
Limited, and in the Netherlands as ES2 Netherlands B.V. The designs of chips with ES2 software were 
translated by their computers into etching instructions for the $4-million Able 150 electron-beam machines, 
manufactured by the Perkin-Elmer Corporation. It was also considered as a ‘Chip Maker Without a Country’, 
The New York Times, August 1, 1988; while others considered it geocentric oriented (Vasudeva 2006, 48). More 
accurately, it was called a ‘company with many countries’ (The Scientist, November 28, 1988). 
14
 The Scientist, November 28, 1988. 
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the USA, and acting in France. The situation changed in 1994 with the arrival of new 
names.
15
 
ES2 presented a decentralized structure since its production, assembly, and testing plant was 
located at the Rousset Technology Centre, near Aix-en-Provence, and one of the technology-
intensive departments (software design) was located in the United Kingdom.
16
 In this sense, 
its birth coincided with the first phase of the microelectronics ‘technopole’ in the town of 
Rousset, characterized by the emergence of a microelectronics cluster in the Bouches-du-
Rhône region when the government aimed to enter the microelectronics industry via public 
enterprises and joint ventures with North American technological partners.
17
  
                                                          
15
 Pruniaux: an engineer in electronics (Toulouse), with two years at Leti (Grenoble CENG), and 4 years at Bell 
Labs (New Jersey), which allowed him to acquire considerable technical expertise in semiconductors. At the 
French facility of Texas Instrument (Nice), he was one of the pioneers of the reduction of the dimensions of the 
chips to increase their performance and reduce their cost. As an industrial director at Eurotechnique, a St. 
Gobain-National Semiconductors joint venture (1979), he contributed early on to the launch of the micro-
electronics cluster in Rousset. He retired in 2008 at Atmel: Letter to Steve Laub, president and chief executive 
officer at Atmel Corporation: EX-10.10 2 f51611exv10w10.htm EXHIBIT 10.10, October 17, 2008. Jean Pierre 
Demange was vice president and director of ES2 for Southern Europe; the general manager was Manfred Koslar, 
developer of the signal computer. The situation in 1994 was as follows: managing directors W. Koepf and 
Bernard Pruniaux; research director and technical director Eric Detoullin; product managers Eric Detoullin and 
Lucien Brau; purchasing manager Jean Louis Palazzo; marketing manager and advertising/publicity manager 
Christian Fleutelot (graduated from the École centrale de Lyon with a post-graduate degree in micro-electronics; 
quality engineer at MATRA defence from 1986–1988); sales manager Jean Yves Lesaux (Wedgwood ed. 2013, 
36). Two examples of the mobility of technicians in the big companies: Lucien Brau (Eurotechnique and Texas 
Instrument), director of back-end operations at European Silicon Structures; Christian Dupuy (Motorola) 
developed product engineering capabilities and analogue design capabilities at European Silicon Structures.  
16
 (European Communities Commission 1989, 48, 207); (Telefónica, Memoria 1985, 6). A decentralized 
structure of design centres was planned: first in Paris, Munich, and London, then, in 1986, in Milan, Stockholm,  
and Edinburgh (PRS Report Science & Technology, November 8 1985, 36). Three production plants were 
planned in the UK, France, and Germany (Le Monde, September 4, 1985). It is worth noting the poetic vein of 
the French grand press: ‘Si drapeau elle a, il est bleu avec un cercle de douze étoiles d’or, l’emblème de la CEE’ 
(Le Monde, March 28, 1987). 
17
 Training was possible at the university centre close to the factory (Meister 2001, 159). For most people 
Rousset was the capital of a Provençal Silicon Valley with 25 per cent of French microelectronics located there. 
The US Milken Institute identified eight key ingredients in the creation of high-tech clusters to grant them 
success from the start. Firstly, the presence of cutting-edge civil and military research centres and institutions, 
which, combined with a network of entrepreneurs and venture capitalists as the second noteworthy element, 
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The entry into operation was a gradual process. As for many companies in the semiconductor 
industry, ES2 was at the beginning a ‘fabless’ firm, or a firm without a plant, geared towards 
technological breakthroughs in microchip design, but subcontracting its products before 
manufacturing began. The Rousset production plant, inaugurated in 1987, began to assemble 
and test circuits, with silicon wafer processing still being performed at Exel Microelectronics 
in California through a subcontracting formula.
18
 As a horizontal alliance, ES2 tried quickly 
to reach economies of scale and critical mass to carve a profitable niche of small production 
series in the region’s $5 billion semiconductors market. Leading-edge e-beam technology 
(direct-write process designs onto silicon wafers with an electron-beam machine) was chosen 
and enabled it to drastically cut (by more than a half) the delivery time for prototype chips 
and the prices of its competitors, namely North American and Japanese firms (Saxby 2012; 
Campbell 2003).
19
 Surprisingly, among future clients, ES2 missed the two most dominant and 
in some ways opposing electronics companies in Europe: Thomson and Siemens.
20
  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
translate into the rapid adoption of technology. The remaining six components are: a skilled and educated work 
force; technology spillovers from nearby high-tech industries; the availability of venture capital; high quality of 
place; and two favourable elements related to low costs – cost of living and cost of doing business, including low 
land prices: Strategy+business, July 1, 2001. 
18
 In February 1986, Exar Integrated Circuits, a publicly owned Californian company, acquired Exel 
Microelectronics for $5.5 million. Exel operated as a subsidiary of Exar and maintained an independent plant 
and R&D staff (Dataquest 1988, 209). 
19
 PRS Report Science & Technology, Europe & Latin America, January 26, 1988, 11–12; Business 
International, 33, 1986,   241. VLSI Technology Inc., a Californian firm worth $125 million and founded in 
1979, specialising in complex high-performance ASICs and ASSPs, was one of ES2’s main competitors. ES2 
was an early buyer of the Aeble 150 machine since it bought the third machine manufactured by Perkin Elmer 
and installed it first at Exel in October 1986, taking on ASIC designs from April 1987, 1-338. The VLSI 
subsidiary, Compass Design Automation, Inc., supplied software and design libraries to the broad commercial 
ASIC and electronic design automation marketplaces. Grand-Clement considered that the gate array market was 
dominated by ‘old-fashioned methodology and a clumsy, rough-and-ready approach’ (Profiles: A Worldwide 
Survey of IC Manufacturers and Suppliers, 1998, 2-446; Electronic Engineering 60, 1988, 23).  
20
 Siemens, engaged in the Mega project with 1Mbit technology from the Toshiba family, showed signs of 
demoting the French-Italian firm SGS-Thomson, resulting in the irritation of SGS-Thomson and the French 
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Thomson and SGS stressed that their moves to attack this sector resulted from their own 
market analyses and were under consideration well before the creation of ES2 was 
announced. Thomson, moving to attack this sector on the basis of its own analyses, offered 
Siemens to lock the market with a joint venture to manufacture circuits on request. After the 
Germans’ refusal, Thomson sought to enter the market with the technical support of the 
English and the Americans (Bonno 1986).   
The business plan failed because the e-beam lithographic machine had a tenth of the 
throughput anticipated for the specifications and the advantages on prices were not met. In 
reality, the technically feasible and differentiating plan placed ES2 outside conventional chip 
manufacturing and inside a shared niche between FPGAs and the semi-custom and full-
custom markets of several firms.
21
 As Saxby recognized, at the time ES2’s members raised a 
‘truckload of money very successfully, had a fantastic idea, failed at engineering 
implementation, then ran out of money… and were bought by ATMEL’, a Californian firm 
looking for a European manufacturing base converted into a worldwide leader in the design, 
manufacturing, and marketing of advanced semiconductors.
22
  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
government. SGS-Thomson vindicated its leadership in erasable programmable read-only memory-chip 
(EPROM) technology and equal financial participation from all three firms (Sandholtz 1992, 293). 
21
 LSI Logic Corp., VLSI Technology Inc., and Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. Ltd.: EE Times 
Europe, January 9, 2014. In 1991, leading European suppliers often concentrating on niche markets and 
application-specific ICs included, together with ES2: ABB-Hafo (Sweden); Austria Microsysteme (Austria); 
GEC Plessey Semiconductors (UK); Matra-Harris Semiconducteurs (France); Mietec (Belgium); and Telefunken 
(Germany). Non-European companies included, among others: AMD (USA); Analog Devices (USA); Fujitsu 
(Japan); Matsushita (Japan); and Mitsubishi (Japan) (Fletcher 2013, 168). Some scholars present ES2 as an 
illustration of how co-investment by semiconductor-using companies can facilitate access to key components 
while spreading the cost (Collins and Doorley 1994, 310). 
22
 (Campbell 2003, 59; Saxby 2012; Le Monde, September 10, 1995; “Atmel and Virage Logic Grow Partnership 
for 0.13-micron SoC Designs”, PR Newswire, January 21, 2003). In Saxby’s words ‘the vision of ES2 couldn’t 
happen really. And really they needed a change of business strategy which was forget the e-beam machine and 
become more conventional.’ Advanced Technology-Memory & Logic (ATMEL), founded by two members of 
the Perlegos family and T.C. Private Funds, specialized in the design, manufacture, and marketing of high-speed 
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Because of the narrowness of the European market, ES2 paid a price to overcome the worst 
aspects of fragmentation and the high costs of coordination in the collaborative venture (Guile 
1987).    
Possibly, the main reason for the let-down was in the conception, which was a sort of trap: a 
niche firm had advantages for expansion but also difficulties because of the strict limits of the 
market. ES2’s share in the European semiconductor market in 1989 was 0.2 with $17 million 
in sales. The pan-European company ranked in the markets of different products as follows: 
116
th
 in 1989 among European companies in the semiconductor market with $18 million; 35
th
 
in the European digital MOS IC; 33
rd
 in the European CMOS IC; 21
st
 in the European MOS 
logic; 19
th
 in the MOS ASIC; and 42
nd
 in the European integrated circuit. With 17 million 
dollars in revenues for ASIC in 1989, ES2 had 1.44 per cent of the total European revenues in 
the ASIC market (Dataquest 1990).
23
  
ES2 rearranged its organizational structure, came out of the European market, and worked to 
insert itself into wider networks. Backed by some US venture capital, it set up United Silicon 
Structures, or US2, an unsuccessful North American subsidiary, which drowned due to 
financial and management problems.
24
 In October 1987, ES2 purchased a software and design 
firm in Japan called Best to convert it into a sales agency for ES2’s products in Japan. Beyond 
these plans, ES2 wanted to form a new production firm under the name of JS2, or Japan 
Silicon Structures.
25
 ES2 and Development Co. formed a joint venture, European CAD 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
and analogue products (Dataquest June 1988, 113). ES2 sold off the CAD division to Cadence where O’Donnell 
helped integrate it.  
23
 Dataquest, European Semiconductor Market Share Estimates Final 1989, 1990; A European Semiconductor 
Industry Service Report (Dataquest 1991, 6). 
24
 Robin Saxby was in charge of making US2 profitable; Tim O’Donnell also joined US2 (Saxby 2012).  
25
 Dataquest, June 1988,   207; Business Week, 3.094–3.097, 1989, 102. 
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Developments Ltd., specialized in research and development activities within the EDA 
and ASIC design markets.
26
 Later on, they planned to expand by linking with the United 
States and a leading venture from West Germany, a country that was absent as co-owner. 
ES2’s path was remarkably linked to that of Lattice Logic, a spin-off company and owner of 
an original automatic Computer Aided Design (CAD) system to layout integrated circuits in 
the gate array style. First, since 1985, ES2 had been a customer of the pioneering silicon 
compiler from Lattice Logic, as was the case for several key enterprises, including Ferranti 
Ltd. The company’s Solo 1000 was based on Lattice Logic’s Chipsmith system, enabling 
designers to produce full-custom and optimized designs.
27
  
Secondly, ES2 strengthened its managerial and technical capacity with the arrival of John 
Gray and Irene Buchanan to the software division, with Gray serving as VP of design 
technology.
28
 Thirdly, ES2 bought its former provider Lattice Logic in 1987 (Dodgson1989; 
Dataquest 1991). 
ES2 formed agreements with several European, Japanese, and North American companies, as 
displayed in Table 2.  
                                                          
26
 Moody’s OTC Industrial News Reports, 20, 1989,   1870; Dataquest 1991, 105. European Cad Developments 
was registered on January 8, 1990 in London and later dissolved. 
27
 Meanwhile, Solo 2000 was based on the SDA Systems family of integrated CAD tools and incorporated 
compiled macro blocks (Dataquest June 1988, 205). ES2 signed contracts for SOLO l000 and SOLO 1200 
software and Qudos QUICKCHIP PLUS software and arrangements for the supply to academic institutions were 
in hand: Journal of Semicustom ICs, 7–8, 1989,   45. European Silicon Structures used CAD SUN 3/SOLO 1400 
for the design, analysis, and simulation of an FSK technology 1.2u filter. ES2 provided goods for educational 
activities in Essex through the London University Consortium (Jones and Buckley 1989,  16). 
28
 Lattice Logic was set up by two PhD graduates of John Gray’s, a lecturer in computer science, when in 1980 
he left the University of Edinburgh. It was hailed as one of the most exciting indigenous start-ups from Silicon 
Glen (Business Herald, April 28 1986, 15). Irene Buchanan, John Gray, and Tom Kean founded Algotronix in 
1989, pioneering the use of FPGA chips. Japanese connection: Lattice licensed its 64 KSRAM design and 
technology to Seiko Epson/S-MOS (Dataquest, October 1986, 28). 
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In 1989, ES2 had revenues of $19.3 million (45 per cent higher than in the previous year but 
substantially below the hope its founders had of $100 million in five years) and ranked 
number one among the participants in pan-European technology programmes (US Congress 
1991).29  
Table 2. Global European Silicon Structures agreements with companies 
Partner Year Purpose 
Etec Systems*   
Development of technology for direct-write gate array 
personalization 
Jenoptika     
Compass Design Automation   
Compass would provide its customers with access to 
Advanced Risk Machines 
Siemens    
Allowed ES2 to produce chips with the Siemens 0.5-
micron CMOS process 
Phoenix VSLI    
United Silicon Structures would make the  prototypes 
and VLSI would handle the volumes 
Cascade Design Automation    
Provide 0.7-micron process technology using 
Cascade’s design tools and ES2’s process technology 
Mitsui&Co. Ltd     
Lattice Logic     1985 Export Lattice’s compiler to Europe 
Solomon Design  
1986 
Market SDA Systems’ design family in Europe and use 
it in several design centres  Associates (SDA) Systems   
Philips-Elcoma-Texas Instruments  1986 Cooperate on the System Cell standard cell library   
Philips-Texas Instruments  1987 
Manufacturing of the System Cell: TI and Philips 
would supply volume parts and ES2 would provide 
prototypes and low-volume quantities 
Exel 1986 Subcontract production to the Exel plant 
Development Co.  1990 R&D within the EDA and ASIC design markets 
Sun Microsystems  1987 
Amalgamate the ES2 Solo 2000 v.i.s.i. design system 
with the Sun-3 workstation 
Source: Compiled by author , * The agreement with Etec Systems was named Eubeam and the agreement with 
Development Co. was called European CAD Developments Ltd. 
                                                          
29
 The strategic Joint European Semiconductor Initiative (JESSI), an initiative to restore European 
competitiveness in microelectronics, was one of the most ambitious collaborative projects launched under 
EUREKA together with the German-dominated High Definition Television (Kassim and Menon, eds. 2002, 233; 
Marchipont 1997, 115), considered the upstream cousin of JESSI, both involving chips (Leuenberger and 
Weinstein, eds. 2012, 28). The European research programmes tried to provide central coordination for 
European national companies and a platform to take a more pro-active approach towards developing standards 
for Europe and worldwide (Dataquest’s eighth annual European Semiconductor Industry Conference, Munich, 
1989, 8). 
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In 1989, ES2 had revenues of $19.3 million (45 per cent higher than in the previous year but 
substantially below the hope its founders had of $100 million in five years) and ranked 
number one among the participants in pan-European technology programmes (US Congress 
1991).
30
  
ES2 was a player in the general ESPRIT and specific JESSI projects, beginning with the 
IDPS, coordinated by Philips International to provide the European IT industry with the basis 
of a full service for designing and producing systems integrated on silicon in various different 
foundries. The rest of the participants were Bull SA., France; GEC Marconi Electronic 
Devices Ltd., United Kingdom; and Robert Bosch GMBH, Germany (CORDIS, Publications 
Office of the European Union). Another two projects were 5075 IDPS Integrated Design and 
Production System with Philips International, Robert Bosch, SGS-Thomson Microelectronics, 
Siemens, Plessey, STC-ICL, and Bull, and the 5080 JPL Joint Logic Project with Philips 
International, Plessey, Siemens-Nixdorf, Telefunken Electronic, SGS-Thomson 
Microelectronics, Mietec, and Matra-MHS (ESPRIT, 1991). 
European Silicon Structures entered into the Technology Initiative in BiCMOS for 
Applications (TIBIA), coordinated by Nederlandse Philips Bedrijven Bv, which aimed to 
satisfy the components needs of the electron ic equipment industry for bipolar and BiCMOS 
ICs technologies at the 0.7–0.5 micron generation, together with the design and CAD 
expertise to exploit the technology. It enjoyed the participation of 17 scientific institutions and 
                                                          
30
 The strategic Joint European Semiconductor Initiative (JESSI), an initiative to restore European 
competitiveness in microelectronics, was one of the most ambitious collaborative projects launched under 
EUREKA together with the German-dominated High Definition Television (Kassim and Menon, eds. 2002, 233; 
Marchipont 1997, 115), considered the upstream cousin of JESSI, both involving chips (Leuenberger and 
Weinstein, eds. 2012, 28). The European research programmes tried to provide central coordination for 
European national companies and a platform to take a more pro-active approach towards developing standards 
for Europe and worldwide (Dataquest’s eighth annual European Semiconductor Industry Conference, Munich, 
1989, 8). 
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10 manufacturing companies (Annex 2), including some Spanish firms and centres.
31
 Critical 
voices acknowledged that the increase in trans-European collaboration funded by the EC was 
a major success of the programme, but also made it sensitive to funding reduction (US 
Congress, 1991).  
Spain 
Spain occupied modest positions in Western Europe as a producer in the semiconductor 
industry (5.5 per cent of the total, far from Germany and the United Kingdom (UK)), and as a 
consumer, with 6 per cent. This Mediterranean nation lagged behind core Western countries 
but was the major semiconductor market of a group of regional category, including Southern 
and Central countries (Switzerland, Austria, Portugal, Greece, Turkey, and Malta). Several 
major telecommunications, data processing, and consumer electronics manufacturers have 
located plants in Spain, attracted by low wages and cheap land (Dataquest 1990). 
Graph 1. Total European semiconductor market, 1990  ($M) 
 
                                                          
31
 CORDIS June 21, 1994. 
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In Spain, the first initiatives in microelectronics succumbed to uncertainty and the ineptitude 
of the government in the first phase of the democratic transition after a long period of 
Francoist dictatorship, as happened with the technical mission to Silicon Valley, heart of high 
technology, which encouraged the North American AMI to make a plan to settle on Spanish 
soil and which also failed. The project to manufacture chips with Motorola as a technology 
partner also suffered a similar fate. The CTNE (Compañía Telefónica Nacional de España) 
tried to assimilate know-how by sending technicians to Motorola’s design centre in 
Switzerland, but despite advances and good rapport, the multinational declined offers because 
of the unattractiveness of the Spanish market, according to the company’s impression. In 
comparative terms, American Micro Systems prompted a similar project in Austria and one of 
the negotiators of Motorola, Pistorio, created the Società Generale Semiconduttori (SGS) in 
Italy, an innovative joint venture between Olivetti and TELETTRA (Calvo 2014). It teamed 
up with ATT in bipolar circuit technologies and merged with Thomson in 1987, setting up 
one of the two major blocks in the European silicon industry, alongside the Central European 
axis Philips-Siemens. This was in sharp contrast with Italy, which was dedicated to the culture 
of the national champion in a context of world market predominance.
32
 A pre-agreement with 
the American Silicon Valley Supertex did not flourish either. This firm had been very 
interested in the infrastructure of the National Centre of Microelectronics to manufacture 
                                                          
32
 Juan Mulet Melià, conversation with the author, Barcelona, 16/5/2013. The multinational Motorola had five 
design centres in Europe: East Kilbride (Scotland), Geneva (Switzerland), Munich (Germany), Toulouse and 
Bordeaux (France). Motorola (fourth in the whole semiconductor industry in terms of revenue after NEC, 
Toshiba, and Intel and, in 2003, 19
th
 among multinational companies in terms of volume of investment in R&D) 
was a pioneer in the introduction of the first 32-bit microprocessor (MC68020), containing 200,000 transistors 
(Fletcher 2013, 129). Its semiconductors section accounted for approximately 30 per cent of its sales; one-third 
of their total revenues was generated outside the US and 7.6–8.3 per cent of its revenues was allocated to R&D 
(Dataquest 1989, 215). Shortly before the end of the decade of 1980, the CTNE leaned on AMPER to create the 
joint mobile venture Telcel Motorola (Calvo 2014, 242; Forsgren 2013, 19; Oral History of Pasquale Pistorio 
Interviewed by Doug Fairbairn, 26/4/2010; ‘Interview with Pasquale Pistorio’, EE Times, 25/3/2005). 
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high-voltage chips for consumer goods in Spain. According to Solana, in order to favour the 
balanced location of cutting-edge technologies for factories throughout the Spanish territory, 
Barcelona was one of the sites considered to compensate for ATT and Fujitsu projects in 
Madrid and Malaga.
33
 Without a doubt, the public sector, represented by the government and 
the INI, appeared in the first plans to create a joint venture with ATT but this road was 
closed.
34
   
Spain was the scene of several international alliances in the microelectronics industry 
sponsored by the government, public institutions, and companies. California Micro Devices 
(CMD), manufacturer of high-performance electronic components through its Thin Film, 
ASIC, and Microcircuits Divisions, agreed with Telefonica to form a subsidiary named 
California Micro Devices, Spain. CMD would provide technology and training and about $2 
million in investment for around one-third of the ownership and would market its components 
to military and civil, aerospace, medical, computer, and communications customers. Products 
sold in Spain would serve Spanish defence needs.
35
 
                                                          
33
 Minutes of the Board of Directors of Telefónica (MBDoT) 28/10/1987; Telefonica compared the project with a 
company, no doubt Supertex, advanced in the ‘smart power chip’ (several technologies integrated on a single 
chip), with that of ATT: Popular Science, November 1985,   85; El País, 15/10/1987. In 1986, IBM embarked 
on a decentralization process in successive steps: transfer of authority to the national subsidiaries; separating 
these into two groups according to a scheme of magnitude and speed of market growth (France, Italy, and 
Germany/rest of Europe), linked to the central offices in Paris (Thakur et al. 1997, 304). IBM opened an 
international Software Development Centre in Barcelona (MBDoT, 28/10/1987; Smidt and Wever 2012, 39. 
Telefónica backed the Everest project to develop tools for testing chips with $40 million dollars: Minutes of the 
Steering Committee of Telefónica (MSCoT), 30/1/1991. 
34
 Agreement between ATT-Compañía Telefónica Nacional de España, 26/7/1984, INI Historical Archive.  
35
 CMD (1980) joined with Capsco Sales (1976), a thin-film company, and in 1982 it established Custom MOS 
Arrays (CMA), which designed, manufactured, and marketed HCMOS cell-based ICs and gate arrays in the 200- 
to 2,000-gate range before merging in 1986 with CMA into one new firm. Components: thin-film passive 
components for hybrid assemblies/gate arrays/cell-based ICs/and non-impact print head substrates as well as 
ASICs (Dataquest 1988, 135–137). CMD represents a typical case of fraud with a dozen or more accounting 
tricks, including fictitious sales and fictitious revenue recognition (one-third of the company’s $45 million in 
revenue in 1994 was spurious) (Securities Exchange Commission 1999; MacDonald 2000; Jones 2011).  
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The Spanish market was of a similar size to the Austrian, each covering around one quarter of 
the size for the total group, with the majority of users coming from consumer, telecom, and 
EDP segments (European Semiconductor Consumption History and Forecast 1985-1995). In 
this country, the socialist government in office, after a period of conservative inertia, 
conceived plans to boost production and research activities with the aim of incorporating the 
country into the mainstream of the electronic revolution and empowering the economy to gain 
competitiveness. This was done by segmenting the market according to technological level. In 
this way, moving towards cutting-edge plans entailed associating with multinational 
technology leaders, while for less sophisticated technology it resorted to national 
technological partners. The company (the phone monopoly), facing the challenge of 
inevitable technological change, situated itself at the forefront of initiatives in the field of 
microelectronics. Personalities and associations in the sector had been pushed in the same 
direction with little success. 
The convergence of all the efforts resulted in a general action plan (Plan Electrónico e 
Informático Nacional: PEIN) and concrete business projects. The largest meant attracting 
investment and technology from the US multinational giant ATT in a joint venture called 
ATT Microelectrónica de España, with factory and research facilities located in Spain, an 
unusual practice for ATT. Both the CTNE as a pioneer in the introduction of microelectronics 
and a natural client of the products and the state as the ‘sector lever’ contributed financial 
resources, support, and infrastructure to make the most advanced company in highly 
sophisticated integrated circuits possible (Calvo 2016; Majó 1997). 
This was not the only initiative of CTNE in the sector; rather, it combined this joint venture 
with others with different characteristics. According to one of the protagonists, CTNE used its 
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huge purchasing and investment power to make industrial policy. Unlike the path adopted in 
general, in the case we examine now (European Silicon Structures), CTNE used its 
purchasing power as a tool for international collective action.
36
  
Demand as a tool for collective action: CTNE 
CTNE was a key enterprise in the national economy due to the considerable figures it 
presented in terms of customers that it had as subscribers (8.5 million) or users (several 
million), employment (61.500), and sales (380,000 billion pesetas). Its decisive weight also 
stemmed from its large annual investments (180,000 million pesetas) and its net fixed assets 
of 1.3 trillion pesetas (Morán and Lada 1984).  
The semi-public Spanish monopoly launched a four-year plan that intended to restructure the 
industry and telecommunications services with a colossal investment of some 800,000 million 
pesetas, half of which was earmarked for the telephone network. Quantitative growth joined 
with the modernization of equipment with electronic and semi-electronic technology and the 
beginning of the adoption of optical fibre.
37
   
The CTNE investment plan emerged almost in parallel to, but independently of, PEIN, which 
was the result of unprecedented joint planning with the government. Still backing innovation, 
it supported technology overlap (soft modernization) as a way to curb unemployment, 
immediate colonization by multinationals, and the inability of workers to absorb new 
technologies (Comparecencia, DSCD, 10/10/1984, 6.498–6.526). In this context, partnerships 
with companies possessing knowledge seemed unavoidable. Because of the implementation 
                                                          
36
 Conversation with Luis Solana, Madrid, March 8, 2016. 
37
 More than two million urban lines and links equivalent to about 700,000 lines; 56 km of optical fibre: El País, 
October 23, 1983. 
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of the plan, effective investment by the CTNE in 1985 almost doubled compared to the 
previous year.
38
 
On 26 December, Telefonica joined the initial group of seven high-tech companies involved 
in European Silicon Structures to develop and manufacture a type of integrated circuit and to 
place that high-technology product within reach of small businesses. The other members of 
the group were Bosch, British Aerospace, Olivetti, Saab Scania, Bull, Philips, and Brown 
Boveri.
39
 These partners were customers and providers of information on markets and 
technology at the same time as being recipients of training in the potential applications of ES2 
products. They joined in on all three major strategic goals, perhaps the most important of 
which was that ES2 products and technology would serve as catalysts for innovation in the 
long term. The investment was also geared towards profitability and access to a 
manufacturing facility working with state-of-the-art silicon at low cost and risk levels.
40
 
Telefonica was the only telecommunications firm in this European-labelled group, due to its 
foundation, headquarters, research centre, and factory.   
Telefonica entered the pan-European company ES2 with 5 per cent, the maximum amount of 
the project’s participants, in order to prevent any further pressures.41 When it came to 
                                                          
38
 The Telefónica Group, 1985, 40. 
39
 Le Monde, December 28, 1985. Some sources excluded Bosch, specified as a member Saab-Scania 
Combitech, an electronics subsidiary of the Swedish automotive and aerospace group, and added Advent, a 
capital risk firm. British Aerospace regarded the European Silicon Structures venture as an important new 
approach to European collaboration in a vital high technology industry: British Business 20, 1986, 3.   
40
 MBDoT, December 18, 1985; Telefónica, Memoria: Balance Social 1984-1985,   156. This type of CMOS 
custom integrated circuit technology in short series fits exactly to the customer’s needs to help increase 
competitiveness by shortening development time, increasing functionality and performance, and reducing costs; 
the North American press greeted it as the new wave of European industry: The New York Times, August 1, 
1988. Custom chips met the same needs as a tailor-made suit (Cane 1987, 37). 
41
 PRS Report Science & Technology, November 8, 1985, 40. Telefonica contributed $2.5 million and owned 
45,000 shares of the total in the hands of Spanish partners, which also included major banks (Banesto, Bilbao, 
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presenting it in the Spanish market, Telefonica emphasized that the new firm was intended to 
serve the custom circuits market and to manufacture prototypes in Europe with time-frames 
and prices that were lower than existing prototypes. The role of Telefonica was summarized 
in its acting as guardian to the introduction of these components into Spain through Comelta y 
Semiconductores S. A., specialized in the distribution and marketing of electronic 
components. On the other hand, Telefonica would provide technical advice to both 
companies, complete design requests, and provide appropriate training courses. 
Table 3. Comparative view of ATT Microelectrónica de España and ES2 profiles 
 
ATT Microelectrónica de España ES2 
City/Country Madrid, Spain Rousset, France 
Products CBIC* customs CBIC, Arrays, Custom mil 
Process technology CMOS M2 CMOS M2 
Min. line width    1.25 0.8 
Wafer size 6 5 
Max. wafer capacity 14,000 1,000 
S. Q. in start capacity (4wks.) 383,320 19,020 
Cleanroom (square feet) 25,000 0 
Cleanroom class              1 10-ene 
Origin of owner      USA Pan-European 
Market structure      Merchant Merchant 
* CBIC: Cell-Based Integrated Circuits: An ASIC device that is customized using a full set of masks and which 
uses automatic placement of cells and automatic routing.  
Source: Compiled by author using European Fab Database 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Hispano, Santander, and Urquijo-Unión): MBDoT, November 26, 1986. The press reduced the contribution of 
Spain to 4 per cent: El País, November 19, 1986. 
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From a comparative perspective, the involvement of Telefonica in ATT Microelectrónica de 
España and ES2 presents several important differences. The more purely technical, contained 
in Table 3, indicate that they did not compete in the same market since ES2 relied on short 
series and ATT on long series.
42
 Other very notable differences are related to the scale, the 
nature of the alliance, the form of financing, the role of Telefonica in the joint venture, and 
the territorial expression of the initiative. AT&T Microelectrónica de España resulted from a 
bilateral agreement between the semi-public monopoly Telefonica and the multinational 
AT&T under the significant political guidance of the governments for several reasons, 
including economic and geostrategic reasons. Unlike what happened with ES2, the Spanish 
government helped Microelectrónica de España with numerous grants, financial and fiscal 
resources, as well as with infrastructures as a counterpart to the location of the firm’s 
productive activity and its taxation in Spanish territory. Microelectrónica de España was a 
case of attraction of FDI over export capital, which was the case of ES2. An integrated market 
for ES2 and Spanish domestic and international markets for MEdE were the formulas 
adopted. Telefonica’s role in the project was subordinate despite the apparent equality of 
participation, judging from the almost total absence of nationals in the management of ES2.
43
 
MEdE was a joint venture with unequal participation from the partners and, therefore, with 
differing levels of control over the company among members. 
 
                                                          
42
 This feature was stressed in Le Monde, December 28, 1985.  
43
 As an exception, Carlos A. López Barrio was chairman of the Strategic Partners Committee of ES2 and a 
member of the Board of Directors. López Barrio is a professor of Electronics Technology at the Universidad 
Politécnica de Madrid (UPM) and director of the Integrated Systems Laboratory (Department of Electronics 
Engineering) (Kabene 2010, 344). 
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Table 4. Top 10 World Digital MOS CBIC 
 
Revenue ($Million) Ranking 
Suppliers by revenue 1987 1988 1989 1989 
VLSI Technology  15 22 29 1 
Austria Mikro Systeme  13 16 24 2 
Texas Instruments  5 12 24 3 
European Silicon Structures  6 12 17 4 
MEDL  5 11 17 5 
Siemens  15 15 17 6 
SGS-Thomson  2 3 15 7 
AT&T  6 9 10 8 
Harris Semiconductor  4 8 10 9 
Honeywell/Atmel  0 0 10 10 
Source: Dataquest, January 1991 
Graph 2. Top 10 Digital MOS CBIC Suppliers  by revenue 
 
Source: Own from Dataquest January 1991) 
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Table 5. Total MOS CBIC suppliers by revenue ($Million) 
 
Revenue ($Million) Ranking 
Suppliers by revenue 1987 1988 1989 1989 
Mietec  27 29 34 1 
Texas Instruments  5 12 30 2 
VLSI Technology  15 22 29 3 
Austria Mikro Systeme  15 19 27 4 
MEDL  5 12 19 5 
SGS-Thomson  2 3 19 6 
European Silicon Structures  6 12 17 7 
Siemens  15 15 17 8 
IMP Europe  2 7 11 9 
LSI Logic  4 7 11 10 
Source: Dataquest Annuary 1991 
Conclusion 
European governments eager to promote competitive industries in their respective countries, corporate 
elites, and the voracity of capital joined forces in high-tech industrial projects in the framework of the 
creation of a single market. Without a doubt, one of the most representative cases was ES2, a pan-
European initiative in the field of microelectronics and semiconductors. Results were far from the 
ambitions of the initial plans, but quite possibly left traces in the configuration of differential features 
of the European industry with regard to the North American and the Japanese industries. In the 
margins of the central axis of the project, Spain played the role of secondary participant through the 
involvement of the CTNE, the telecommunications monopoly very soon to disappear to conform to 
Community rules. CTNE in general used its purchasing and investment power as a tool for industrial 
policy but in the case we have surveyed (European Silicon Structures), CTNE used its purchasing 
power as a means for a new supply source and for collective international action. 
 
 
Volume 2, Number 1, 235-265, July-December 2016           doi.org/10.1344/JESB2016.2.j018  
 
Online ISSN: 2385-7137                                                                                                      COPE Committee on Publication Ethics 
http://revistes.ub.edu/index.php/JESB  Creative Commons License 4.0      
261 
Acknowledgments 
Financial support has been received from the Spanish Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad, 
research project HAR2013-41453-P. 
Primary sources 
INI Historical Archive, Madrid. 
Securities Exchange Commission, US. 
Telefonica, Minutes of the Board of Directors, Madrid. 
Telefonica, Minutes of the Steering Committee, Madrid.  
Oral sources 
Computer History Museum, Mountain View, USA. 
Juan Mulet Melià, conversation with the author, Barcelona.  
Luis Solana, conversation with the author, Madrid, March 8, 2016. 
Oral History of Pasquale Pistorio Interviewed by Doug Fairbairn. 
References 
Bonno, G. 1986. “Des puces sur mesure.” Electronics 59 on-line. 
Brooke, Peter A., and Daniel Penrice. 2009. A Vision for Venture Capital: Realizing the Promise of 
Global Venture Capital and Private Equity. Boston: UPNE. 
Calvo, Angel. 2014. Standard Eléctrica y la industria de las telecomunicaciones en España, 1877-
1975. Barcelona: Ariel. 
Campbell, Katharine. 2003. Smarter Ventures: A Survivor’s Guide to Venture Capital. London: 
Pearson Education. 
Cane, Alan. 1987. “ES2 Moves Bespoke Chips Towards Off-the-Peg Prices.” Financial Times, June 
10. 
Collins,  Timothy, and Thomas L. Doorley. 1994. Teaming Up for the ‘90s: A Guide to International 
Joint Ventures and Strategic Alliances. Homewood IL: McGraw-Hill School Education Group. 
Cowhey, Peter F., and Jonathan D. Aronson. 1993. Managing the world economy: the consequences of 
corporate alliances. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press. 
Dataquest. 1988. A decade of semiconductor companies. San José: Dataquest. 
Dataquest. 1989. Worldwide Semiconductor Companies. San José: Dataquest. 
Dataquest. 1990. European semiconductor consumption forecast 1983-1995. San José: Dataquest. 
Dataquest. 1991. Semiconductors Europe. San José: Dataquest. 
 
Volume 2, Number 1, 235-265, July-December 2016           doi.org/10.1344/JESB2016.2.j018  
 
Online ISSN: 2385-7137                                                                                                      COPE Committee on Publication Ethics 
http://revistes.ub.edu/index.php/JESB  Creative Commons License 4.0      
262 
Dunning, John H. 2001. “The eclectic (OLI) paradigm of international production: Past, present and 
future.” International Journal of the Economics of Business 8 (2): 173–190. 
Dodgson, Mark, ed. 1989. Technology Strategy and the Firm: Management and Public Policy. New 
York: Longman. 
ESPRIT. 1991. Progress and results 1990/91. Luxembourg: Commission of the European 
Communities. 
Faulhaber, Gerald R., and Gualtiero Tamburini. 2012. European Economic Integration: The Role of 
Technology. New York: Springer.  
Fletcher, André. 2013. Profile of the Worldwide Semiconductor Industry: Market Prospects to 1997. 
Oxford: Elsevier. 
Forester, Thomas. 1989. High-Tech Society: The Story of the Information Technology Revolution. 
Cambridge, MASS: MIT Press. 
Forsgren, Mats. 2013. Theories of the Multinational Firm: A Multidimensional Creature in the Global 
Economy. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Friend, Julius W. 1998. The Long Presidency: France in the Mitterrand Years, 1981-1995. Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press.  
Guile, Bruce R. 1987. Technology and Global Industry: Companies and Nations in the World 
Economy. Washington: National Academies Press. 
Hill, Charles W. L., Gareth R. Jones, and Melissa A. Schilling. 2016. Strategic Management: Theory: 
An Integrated Approach. Boston, MA: Cengage Learning. 
Johanson, Jan, and Jan-Erik Vahlne. 2009. “The Uppsala internationalization process model revisited: 
From liability of foreignness to liability of outsidership.” Journal of International Business 
Studies 40 (9): 1411–31. 
Jones, Phil L., and Anne Buckley. 1989. Electronics Computer Aided Design. Manchester: Manchester 
University Press. 
Jones, Michael J. 2011. Creative Accounting, Fraud and International Accounting Scandals. 
Chichester: John Wiley & Sons. 
Kabene, Stéfane M. 2010. Human Resources in Healthcare, Health Informatics and Healthcare 
Systems. New York: Idea Group Inc.  
Kassim, Hussein, and  Anand Menon, eds. 2002. The European Union and National Industrial Policy. 
London: Routledge. 
Klincewicz, Krzysztof. 2005. Strategic Alliances in the High-tech Industry. Berlin: Logos Verlag. 
Leuenberger, Theodor, and Martin E. Weinstein. 2012. Europe, Japan and America in the 1990s: 
Cooperation and Competition. Berlin: Springer. 
 
Volume 2, Number 1, 235-265, July-December 2016           doi.org/10.1344/JESB2016.2.j018  
 
Online ISSN: 2385-7137                                                                                                      COPE Committee on Publication Ethics 
http://revistes.ub.edu/index.php/JESB  Creative Commons License 4.0      
263 
Lipnack, Jessica, and Jeffrey Stamps. 1993. The TeamNet Factor: Bringing the Power of Boundary 
Crossing Into the Heart of Your Business. Essex: Wiley. 
MacDonald, Elizabeth. 2000. “Regulators seek to penalize auditors who missed fraud.” Wall Street 
Journal, February 19. 
Majó, Joan. 1997. Chips, cables y poder. Barcelona: Planeta.  
Marchipont, Jean-François. 1997. La stratégie industrielle de l’Union européenne. Conséquences et 
enjeux. Paris: Éditions Continent Europe.  
Meister, Jeanne C. 2001. Building a learning organization: 7 lessons to involve your CEO. San José: 
iUniverse.  
Morán, José Manuel, and Luis Lada. 1984. “Los planes de Telefónica.” El País, May 2. 
Mytelka, Lynn Krieger. 1990. Strategic Partnerships: States, Firms, and International Competition. 
London: Pinter. 
Pouderoux, Noël. 1968. “La micro-électronique européenne face aux Etats-Unis.” 
Le Monde diplomatique, December  22.  
Sandholtz, Wayne. 1992. High-Tech Europe: The Politics of International Cooperation. 
Berkeley: University of California Press.  
Robin, Saxby. Interview with Dane Elliot and Doug Fairbairn. Oral History of Sir Robin Saxby. 
Mountain View, California, October 16, 2012.  
Smidt, Marc, and Egbert Wever. 2012. The Corporate Firm in a Changing World Economy: Case 
Studies in the Geography of Enterprise. Abingdon: Routledge. 
Thakur, Manab, Gene E. Burton, and B. N. Srivastava. 1997. International Management: Concepts 
and Cases. New Delhi: McGraw-Hill. 
US Congress. 1991. Competing economies: America, Europe, and the Pacific Rim. Washington: 
DIANE Publishing. 
Vasudeva, P. K. 2006. International Marketing. New Delhi: Excel Books. 
Wedgwood, C. G., ed. 2013. European Electronics Directory 1994: Systems and Applications. 
Oxford: Elsevier. 
Yin, Robert K. 1993. Applications of case study research. Applied Social Research Series, Vol. 34. 
London: Sage. 
 
 
 
 
Volume 2, Number 1, 235-265, July-December 2016           doi.org/10.1344/JESB2016.2.j018  
 
Online ISSN: 2385-7137                                                                                                      COPE Committee on Publication Ethics 
http://revistes.ub.edu/index.php/JESB  Creative Commons License 4.0      
264 
Annex 1. Board of directors of European Silicon Structures, 1988 
Name Position Prior firm Prior Position 
J.L. Grand-Clement  CEO/MngDir  Motorola  VP Europe Group  
Pierre Lesieur  VPFin/Admin  Motorola  Dir Finance  
Rod Attwooll  VP/DirOps  Texas Instrument  Mng Dir Bedford  
Bernard Pruniaux  VP/Mfg  Thomson CSF  Dir Opns  
John Gray  VP/DirS/ WTech  Lattice Logic  Founder/Mng Dir  
J.P. Demange  VP/DirS.Europe  National  Dir Strat Mktg  
H.P. Friedrich  VP/DirCentra Europe  N/A  Mng Dir  
Francis Courrèges  WfrFabMgr  Sierra Semicond  Prod Eng Mgr  
Eric Demoulin  DirTechnology  Thomson CSF  Dir MOS Tech 
Source: Compiled by author using Dataquest, June 1988, p. 205. 
Annex 2. Participants in the Technology Initiative in BiCMOS for Applications (TIBIA)   
Companies 
ALCATEL BELL MANUFACTURING COMPANY, Belgium; ALCATEL SEL AG, Germany; GEC 
Plessey Semiconductors PLC, United Kingdom; PHILIPS CONSUMER ELECTRONICS B.V., 
Netherlands; SGS THOMSON MICROELECTRONICS SA, France; SGS-Thomson Microelectronics 
SrL, Italy; SIEMENS AG, Germany; Semiconductores Investigación y Diseño, Tres Cantos Spain; 
TELEFONICA I+D, Spain; TEMIC TELEFUNKEN MICROELECTRONIC GMBH, Germany.  
Scientific institutions  
CENTRO NACIONAL DE MICROELECTRONICA, BELLATERRA, Spain; Centre National 
d’Études des Télécommunications (CNET), France; Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique (CEA), 
France; Centre d’Études de Grenoble, France; DELFT INSTITUTE OF MICROELECTRONICS & 
SUBMICRONTECHNOLOGY, Netherlands; ÉCOLE POLYTECHNIQUE FEDERALE DE 
LAUSANNE, Switzerland; INDUSTRIAL MICROELECTRONICS CENTER, Sweden; INSTITUTO 
DE ENGENHARIA DE SISTEMAS E COMPUTADORES, Portugal; Inter-University 
Microelectronics Center, Belgium; LINKOEPING UNIVERSITY, Sweden; NATIONAL 
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TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY OF ATHENS, Greece; NMRC, University College Cork, Ireland; 
SIEMENS ENTWICKLUNGSZENTRUM FUER MIKROELEKTRONIK, Austria; TECHNICAL 
RESEARCH CENTRE OF FINLAND, Finland; TECHNISCHE UNIVERSITAET BERLIN, 
Germany; TECNOPOLIS CSATA NOVUS ORTUS; UNIVERSITY OF CATANIA, Italy; 
UNIVERSITY OF DUBLIN, Ireland; SCRL, Italy. 
Source: CORDIS June 21, 1994. 
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